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                                             Abstract 
This paper is a clear and concise comparison of the realist, liberal, and 
constructivist perspectives in international relations (IR). The paper 
compares the approaches and perspectives of scholars from these three 
schools of thought to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the 
possibility of stability to emerge under international anarchy. This paper 
shows that scholars from the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools of 
thought in IR offer different approaches and perspectives to anarchy and 
the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. Also, the paper shows that even within the same 
school of thought, there are contrasting positions on the conditions that 
can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under anarchy. 
 



































































The term “Stability” is often contested in international politics. Stability can 
mean peace or the absence of conflict and war (Martin, 2005).On the other 
hand, stability can also mean “the endurance of a particular distribution of 
power regardless of how peaceful it is” (Martin, 2002: 19). The field of IR 
(International Relations) also referred to as International Studies, Global 
Studies, or International Politics is an important field of study in our 
contemporary society. IR is interdisciplinary (Long, 2011:31), it is the study 
of politics, economics, and law at the global level. Moreover, IR studies the 
relations among states at the international level (Schuett & Stirk, 2015:7). 
In the field of IR, the state is a central element; IR scholars view the state 




Relations among states from time immemorial have been marked by 
conflicts and wars due to the lack of order in the international system 
(Clackson, 2011). The lack of order and a centralized authority in the 
international system has put states in a position where they have to decide 
for themselves whether to use force or not. Given this situation, several IR 
theories have been developed by scholars in the IR discipline to explain the 
lack of order in the international system and to shed some light on the 
conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. For instance, some of the mainstream IR theories that 
have been developed to explain the lack of order in the international system 
and the possibility of peace or stability to emerge under international 
anarchy are “Realism”, “Liberalism”, and 





“Constructivism”. Also, the concept of “Anarchy” has been one of the major 
concepts of these three schools of thought. Scholars from the realist, 
liberal, and constructivist schools of thought have come up with different 
perspectives and approaches to international anarchy and the conditions 
can that increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under anarchy. To 
begin with, scholars from the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools of 
thought all agree that the international system is anarchic (Waltz, 1979: 
Grieco, 1988: Oye, 1985: Jervis, 1978: 
Mearsheimer, 2001: Milner, 1991: Keohane, 1982: Doyle, 1986: Owen, 
1994: Glaser, 1994/1995: Mearsheimer, 2010:Wendt, 1992). In addition, 
they agree that certain conditions can increase the likelihood of stability to 




However, scholars from these three schools of thought also offer 
different approaches and perspectives to anarchy and the conditions that 
can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international 
anarchy. Even within the same school of thought, there are contrasting 
positions on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. For Instance, liberals such as Robert 
O. Keohane, Kenneth Oye, Michael Doyle, Joseph S. Nye, and John M. 
Owen, emphasize the possibility of cooperation as well as peace when 
discussing stability under international anarchy. These liberal scholars 
argued that stability can be achieved under international anarchy through 
cooperation and peace. They argued that certain conditions such as 
absolute gains, the number of main actors in a negotiation, international 
regimes, economic interdependence, and the democratic peace thesis can 
increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy 
(Keohane, 1882: Doyle, 1977: Owen, 1994, Oye, 1985; Keohane and Nye: 
1987). On the other hand, realist scholars such as Grieco and Kenneth 
Waltz argue that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under 





international anarchy because of relative gains (Grieco, 1988: Waltz, 
1979). However, realists emphasize that under certain conditions such as 
bipolarity and hegemony, peace is possible (Waltz, 1979, Mearsheimer, 
2001). On the other side of the coin, constructivists argued that “anarchy is 
what we make of it” (Wendt, 1992). This means that the effects of anarchy 
are dependent upon the inter-subjective meanings we attach to it. As 
aforementioned, there have been a lot of debates among scholars from the 
realist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought on the meaning of 
“anarchy” and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. These scholars present contrasting 
perspectives and approaches to anarchy and the conditions that can 
increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. 
This paper aims to compare and contrast the realist, liberal, and 
constructivist approaches to anarchy and their perspectives on the 
conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. I argue that certain conditions can increase the 




This paper is divided into five sections. The first section of this paper is 
the introduction. The introduction provides a brief background of the realist, 
liberal, and constructivist approaches to anarchy and their perspectives on 
how stability can emerge under international anarchy. The second section 
of this paper discusses in detail the realist approach to anarchy and their 
perspectives on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. In addition, the second section of this 
paper shows that even within the realist school of thought, scholars offer 
contrasting positions on how stability can emerge under international 
anarchy. The third section of this paper compares and contrasts the liberal 
approach to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of 
stability to emerge under 





international anarchy versus the realist perspectives and approaches. 
Moreover, the third section also shows that even within the liberal school of 
thought, scholars have contrasting positions on how stability can emerge 
under international anarchy. The fourth section of this paper compares and 
contrasts the constructivist approach to anarchy and the conditions that 
can increase the chances of stability to emerge under international 
anarchy versus the realist and liberal approaches. The fifth and final 
section of this paper is the conclusion which sums up the main 
discussions presented in the paper. 
2. The Realist approach to Anarchy and their Perspectives on the 
Conditions that can increase the likelihood of Stability to emerge 




2.1 The Realist Approach to Anarchy 
 
Before discussing realist perspectives on how stability can emerge under 
international anarchy, it may be useful to highlight key aspects of the realist 
approach to anarchy in international politics. Realism is considered a 
dominant theory in IR and as such, it seems logical to begin by highlighting 
the key aspects of the realist approach to anarchy. A key principle of realist 
theory is that of survival. As mentioned earlier, realists view anarchy as 
lack of order, their definitions of anarchy suggest conditions of chaos in the 
international system (Milner, 1991) and realists contend that cooperation is 
difficult to achieve and sustain under international anarchy because of 
relative gains (Grieco, 1988), however, realists argue that peace is 
possible under certain conditions like bipolarity. Similarly, realists argue 
that due to a lack of order in the international system, states do everything 
for their survival and security and realists believe that states are the major 
actors in international politics (Grieco, 1988:488). In addition, realist 
scholars agree that 





anarchy exists in the international system, but that anarchy varies. It is 
logical to argue that in domestic politics, governments create and enforce 
laws to protect citizens, thus, reducing the possibility of conflict or war to 
occur, however, the same cannot be said of international politics 
(Lebow:2007). A central assumption of the realist approach to anarchy is 
thus that the rules of the international system are dictated by anarchy; in 
this sense, anarchy is perceived as a “lack of central government to 
enforce rules and protect states” (Goldstein & Pevehouse: 2006: 73). 
Realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, link this lack of a ‘world government’ to 
the continued occurrence of violence among states (Cudworth & Hobden: 
2010). The absence of an authority higher than nation-states, it is argued, 
leads to a self-help system among states (Weber: 2009; Cudworth & 
Hobden: 2010); Lebow cites Mearsheimer’s characterization of this 
anarchical, self- help, international system as a “brutal arena where states 
look for opportunities to take advantage of each other” (Lebow: 2007: 55). 
This characterization can be linked to the idea that international relations 
“cannot escape from a state of anarchy and will continue to be dangerous 




Such perceptions demonstrate that realists have a largely pessimistic 
view of the international system (Grieco: 1988). Overall, all realists appear 
to accept that states are the only relevant actors in international politics, 
and as there is no central authority to regulate or govern nation- states, a 
state of anarchy exists, where conflict and war is a constant threat as each 
state seeks to ensure its survival at the expense of others. However, there 
exist internal divisions within the IR theory of realism between classical 
realism and structural neo-realism. While both agree that war is 
unavoidable in an anarchic international system, they disagree over how 
anarchy will cause war in the international system. While classical realists 
contend that the inevitability of war in an 





anarchical system is due to the destructive tendency of human nature, 
structural realists argue that this has little to do with why states engage in 
the struggle for power (Mearsheimer, 2007). 
Structural or neo-realism, often associated with the work of Waltz, 
argues that “internationally, states operate in a context of anarchy which 
dictates certain kinds of priorities 
and behavior to ensure international order and relative advantage within it” 
(Hutchings, 1999). In this sense Waltz appears to be arguing against 
Morgenthau’s notion that there is little distinction between domestic and 
international politics and that as states operate in an international context of 
anarchy that their behavior and relationships at an international level will be 
very different from those at a domestic level. Structural realism thus 
concentrates on the structure of international society to explain why states 
behave in the “often conflicting” manner that they do. In seeking to explain 
the causes of war, Waltz argues that not even the growth in numbers of 
democratic states can override the structure of international politics to 




Whereas classical realism assumes war to be a constant threat, neo-
realists argue that, although there is no automatic harmony in anarchy, it is 
possible to create a sense of order within anarchy through the balance of 
power (Weber, 2009). For neo-realists, it is not only states that are relevant 
actors in international politics, but great power states who are crucial to the 
balance of power in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2007). It is 
argued that power ratios among great powers, such as the US or China, 
affect the prospects for peace, demonstrating that the structure of the 
international system in terms of unipolarity, bipolarity, or multi-polarity and 
any resulting power shifts can increase or reduce the likelihood of 
international conflict (Ibid.). In 





this case, structural realism suggests that anarchy is still the “permissive 
cause of war”, however elements of anarchy can be overcome by 
structuring the balance of power in a way that reduces the chance of 
conflict (Weber: 2009: 14). Having discussed the key features of the realist 
approach to anarchy, I will now move on to discuss in detail, perspectives 
put forth by realist scholars on conditions that can increase the likelihood 
of stability to emerge under international Anarchy. These perspectives will 
be discussed under the following themes: Defensive vs. offensive realism 




2.2 Defensive vs. Offensive realism on Polarity 
 
Polarity in international relations focuses on the different ways in which 
power is distributed within the international system. Polarity distinguishes 
three types of system (1) Unipolarity (one powerful state) (2) Bilority (two 
powerful states), (3) Multipolarity (Three or more powerful states). Many 
international relations theorists believe that the cold post-war international 
system is unipolar due to the rise of the U. S as the sole superpower of the 
world. For instance, Krauthammer developed a theory which he called “the 
unipolar moment”, he argued that the U.S emerged as the only great power 
from the cold war (Varisco, 2013). 
Defensive and offensive realism presents different views on the causal 
relations between polarity and international stability. Defensive realism 
lead by Kenneth Waltz gave polarity a normative assessment as early as 
1964 when he argued for the stability of bipolarity (Waltz, 1994). In his 
1979 book “ Theory of International Politics”, Waltz argued that stability is 
more likely to emerge under international anarchy in a bipolar system 
where two main world powers are dominating the international system 
economically, militarily, and culturally (Waltz, 1979). 





Similarly, Waltz argued that self-help systems make cooperation among 
states difficult. He explained that in a bipolar world, there are only two main 
powers and there are no peripheries, which increases the prospects for 
peace or stability. According to Waltz, this is because the two main powers 
are aware that they would lose heavily if they were to engage in a major 
war against each other, thereby increasing the chances for peace or 
stability to emerge under international anarchy. Moreover, Waltz argued 
that an increased number of actors (great powers) increases the level of 
uncertainty and reduce the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under 
international anarchy (Waltz, 1979). He argued that unipolar and multipolar 
systems reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international 
anarchy (Waltz, 1979: 136). According to Waltz, a bipolar system would 
lead to the formation of alliances between the two great powers, which will 
make the world to be peaceful, thus, increasing the prospects for stability 




On the other hand, offensive realism led by Mearsheimer agrees with 
Waltz that a bipolar system is a system that has two great powers 
dominating the world and that this type of system increases the likelihood 
of stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to 
Mearsheimer bipolar system is the first system that can increase the 
chances of stability to emerge under international anarchy and the second-
best system is multipolarity (Mearsheimer, 2001). Mearsheimer contends 
that a bipolar system is more peaceful and increases the chances of 
stability to emerge under anarchy because under a bipolar system only two 
major powers are in contention and these two great powers generally 
demand allegiance from the minor powers in the international system. For 
Mearsheimer, these alliances make the smaller states to be secure from 
each other as well as from attacks from great powers. Moreover, 
Mearsheimer explains that a 





bipolar system offers more chances for stability to emerge under 
international anarchy because since only two great powers are dominating 
the international system, it is impossible to produce the power asymmetries 
that result in ganging up and bullying (Mearsheimer, 2001). Furthermore, 
Mearsheimer contends that deterrence is more problematic under 





However, Mearsheimer also differs from Waltz because He argues that 
the prospects for peace are not simply a function of the number of great 
powers in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001). He explained that the 
prospects for peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy are 
also affected by the relative military strength of those states (Ibid). 
Mearsheimer explains that bipolar and multipolar systems are both likely 
to be more peaceful if power is distributed equally between them. He 
argues that power inequalities invite war and instability because it 
increases an aggressor’s prospect for victory on the battlefield 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). In sum, Mearsheimer’s argument that bipolar and 
multi-polar systems can both increase the likelihood of peace or stability 
to emerge under international anarchy if power is distributed equally 
among states differs from Waltz’s argument that two powerful states 
dominating the international scene in a bipolar system is more likely to 
increase the possibility of stability to emerge under international anarchy 
(Waltz, 1979). 





2.3 Game Theory Approach 
 
Robert Jervis in his 1978 article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” 
contends that cooperation is difficult to sustain and achieved under 
international anarchy. He acknowledges that cooperation is difficult to 
achieve under international anarchy but not impossible. Jervis explained 
that one condition under which cooperation and stability are likely to 
emerge under international anarchy is through the game theory approach. 
Jervis uses three games in his game theory approach to explain how 
cooperation and stability can emerge under international anarchy. The 
three games that he used to explain the likelihood of cooperation and 
stability under international anarchy are (1) Prisoner’s Dilemma, (2) Stag 
Hunt, and (3) Chicken. In-game 1 which is “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, Jervis 
explained that both players have the incentive to defect no matter whether 
the other player cooperates or defects. Jervis argued that if the other 
player decides to cooperate, the first player prefers to defect (DC>CC). 
Contrarily, if the other player defects, the first player still prefers to defect 
(DD>CD). Both players will do worse if they both defects than if they have 
both cooperated: CC>DD. Thus, each player’s preference order in the 




Jervis explained that since each player pursues DC (You do not 
concede, but the other player does) they will, as a group end up reaching 
DD (Both players do not concede), which ranked 3rd in the preference rank. 
The two players could end up reaching CC (Potential mutual cooperation) 
which is the 2nd best choice under Prisoner’s Dilemma for cooperation and 
stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to Jervis, the 
best order for cooperation to emerge under international anarchy is 
DC>CC>DD>CD. With DC (You do not concede, the other player 





does) being the best condition for cooperation and stability to emerge 
under international anarchy in his “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game and CC 
(Potential mutual cooperation) is the second- best situation in which 
cooperation and stability can emerge under international anarchy. In the 
second game “Stag Hunt”, Jervis explained that if both players believe that 
mutual cooperation is worse than mutual defection the game will become a 
deadlock. He explained that each player’s preference order in the Stag 
Hunt game is CC>DC>DD>CD. Hence, according to Jervis, the best 
condition under which cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge 
under anarchy in his Stag Hunt game is CC (potential mutual cooperation) 
followed by DC (you do not concede but the other player does), then DD 
(both players do not concede) and CD (You concede and the other player 




In both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt game, CD is the most unlikely 
scenario under which stability can emerge under international anarchy 
because cooperation is highly unlikely to occur under this situation. Jervis 
argued in the Stag Hunt game that both players understand that CC is the 
best option as a group, but each player does not know if the other player 
understands this. Jervis noted that if the other side defects each will end up 
obtaining the 4th ranked situation CD which is the worst scenario for 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. According 
to Jervis, because the dominant strategy of each player is to defect, the 
likely outcome is DD. Unlike in Prisoner’s Dilemma, players in a deadlock in 
the Stag Hunt game will not benefit if the play is repeated because mutual 
cooperation is not preferred to mutual defection (Jervis, 1978:178). 





In the third game “Chicken”, Jervis explained that the players will still 
have to cooperate even if they think that the other side is going to defect 
because though being exploited is bad (CD) it is not as bad as when both 
do not concede (DD). The main player must try to convince his adversary 
that he is going to defect and that the only way that the other player can 
avoid disaster is to cooperate (Jervis, 1978:178). According to Jervis, this 
will increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. Jervis argued in the “Chicken” game that there are 
high prospects for cooperation and stability to emerge under international 
anarchy if the main player can convince his adversary that he is going to 
pull out of the negotiation if the other player does not cooperate. Further, 





Just like in the prisoner’s dilemma, DC is the best scenario for 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy in the 
chicken game and CC (Mutual cooperation) is the second-best. Under 
this game, if you keep defecting, you will encounter the best or worst 
scenario and if you cooperate you will get the second (CC) or the third-
best scenario (CD). 
Jervis explained in “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” that states 
use all means to maximize their security which can decrease the security 
of other states. When this happens, states that feel threatened take 
countermeasures to secure themselves as well, which can lead to a 
security dilemma. Overall, Jervis argued in his game theory approach that 
cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international 
anarchy if the net of CC –DD increases and the net of DC-CD decreases. 





2.7 Absolute and Relative Gains 
 
Unlike Jervis, who uses the game theory to explain how stability can emerge 
under international anarchy, and Kenneth Waltz, who emphasizes bipolar 
systems as a condition for peace, Joseph 
M. Grieco in his article “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation” agrees with 
other realists like Waltz and Jervis that cooperation is difficult to achieve 
and sustain under international anarchy. However, Grieco disagrees with 
new liberals that states seek to maximize their absolute gains and are 
indifferent to the gains achieved by others (Grieco, 1988:487). Grieco 
contends that cooperation is difficult to emerge under international 
anarchy, not only because states are worried about their absolute gains as 
the liberals contend, but because states are also worried that their partners 




Hence, Grieco's main argument is that a state will focus more on both its 
absolute and relative gain to increase the likelihood of cooperation and 
stability to emerge under international anarchy (Grieco, 1988). He argued 
that a state that is satisfied with a partner’s compliance with an 
arrangement might still decide to exit from the arrangement if it realizes that 
the other partner is achieving relatively greater gains which will make it 
difficult to achieve cooperation and stability under international anarchy 
(Grieco, 1998:487). Thus, Grieco believes that two major obstacles make 
cooperation difficult to achieve under international anarchy. The first major 
obstacle that makes cooperation difficult to achieve in an anarchical 
international system is states' concern about cheating and the second 
major obstacle to cooperation, according to Grieco is states' concerns 
about relative achievements of gains. All in all, Grieco emphasize relative 
gains, he criticized Kenneth Oye and other liberals for underestimating 
relative gain concerns and thus 





overestimate the possibility of cooperation to emerge under anarchy 
because these liberals focus mainly on absolute gains. This point by Grieco 
is agreed by Kenneth Waltz, like Grieco, Waltz also argued that liberals 
overestimate the possibility of cooperation to emerge under international 
anarchy by focusing solely on absolute gains and ignoring the relative 






Mearsheimer in his article “The Tragedy of Great Power politics” provides a 
contrasting position from Jervis, Grieco, and Waltz, on how stability can 
emerge under international anarchy. He argued that “the best way for a 
state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain 
power at their expense, according to him, “the best defense is a good 
offense” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 36). Mearsheimer explained that stability can 
emerge under international anarchy when states are powerful. He argued 
that if states are powerful they will not be scared of being attacked by other 
states and this can increase the chances of peace or stability to emerge 
under international anarchy. 
For Mearsheimer, the best way for states to survive in the international 
system that is anarchy and for stability to exists under international anarchy 
is for states to be very powerful (Mearsheimer, 2001:36). Mearsheimer 
believes that power ratios among great powers such as the 
U.S. and China, affect the prospects for peace or stability, demonstrating 
that the structure of the international system in terms of unipolarity, 
bipolarity, or multi-polarity and any resulting power shifts can increase or 
reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. He 
believes that the best way for states to achieve security and stability in an 
anarchic international 





system is to pursue hegemony. Mearsheimer's explanations on how 
hegemony can cause stability to emerge under international anarchy differ 
from Jervis’ game theory approach discussed above and it also differs from 
the relative gains of cooperation that Grieco and Waltz emphasize. For 
Mearsheimer, hegemony, and states becoming powerful is the best 
condition that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. 
Furthermore, both Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz agree that cooperation 
is difficult to achieve and sustain under anarchy. However, Mearsheimer 
differs from Waltz because he believes that peace or stability can emerge 
under international anarchy if several states become powerful. This 
contrasts Waltz’s perspective that stability is more likely to emerge under 
international anarchy under a bipolar system where there are only two great 
powers like the United States and China and other weaker states forming 
alliances under these two great powers (Waltz, 1979). Likewise, Glaser 
disagrees with Mearsheimer’s perspective that order can be achieved in the 
international system through hegemony. He argued that cooperation should 
be states preferred option for order (Glaser, 1994:58); Glaser also contends 
that cooperative policies are an important type of self- help. 
3. Liberal vs. Realist Approaches to Anarchy and their Perspectives 
on the Conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to 




3.1 Liberal vs. Realist Approaches to Anarchy 
 
Moving on to liberalism, “Liberalism” is a theory base on the belief that 
individuals are the basis of law and society. Liberalism focuses on society 
as a collection of individuals rather than the state. It focuses on society as 
the ultimate source of state behavior and preferences in 





international politics (Moravcsik, 2011:2). There are different types of 
liberalism, such as “Republican Liberalism”, “Commercial Liberalism”, and 
“Institutional Liberalism”. While Liberals agree with realists that 
international anarchy does exist, they differ with realists in several ways. To 
start with, Liberals disagree with realists that there is no centralized 
authority in the international system. Liberals argued that international 
institutions play a vital role in the cooperation among states at the 
international level. Hence, Liberals believe that international institutions can 
act as a centralized authority in an anarchical international system. 
Moreover, liberal scholars argued that the right international institutions 
and an increased interdependence will provide states the opportunity to 
reduce conflicts in international anarchy (Keohane, 1982:346-347). 
Similarly, scholars from the Liberal school of thought believe that state and 
non- state actors can come together to establish institutions and rules 




Also, liberals believe that through joint cooperation, states can work 
together on a series of issues, and because of this, they can increase their 
absolute power (International Relations. Org, 2016). Powell in his 1994 
article, argued that the main difference between realist and liberal 
approaches to international anarchy is the manner in which both camps 
look at how actors will behave in an anarchical international system 
(Powell, 1994). Realists argue that anarchy leads to violence and distrust 
in the international system. Contrarily, liberals disagree with realists on 
this, rather, liberals argue that anarchy is not something that will lead to 
violence and distrust among states in the international system, but rather, 
anarchy is merely a condition that people living in the world can overcome 
through cooperation and joint ventures (Ibid). 





Additionally, unlike realists that worry about relative power under 
international anarchy, liberals do not worry about relative power, rather, 
they argue for absolute power. Liberals believe that as long as states have 
mutual benefits of cooperation, they do not need to worry about relative 
power with each other. Overall, liberals argued that the following 
conditions can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to 
emerge under international anarchy: democratic peace, complex 
interdependence, international regimes, game matrix, the number of main 
actors involved in a negotiation, and increase interaction among states at 
the international level (Keohane, 1882: Doyle, 1977: Oye, 1985, Keohane 
and Nye: 1987). In the remainder of this section, I will compare and 




2.3 Game Matrix/Payoff Structure 
 
Unlike Waltz and Grieco, who emphasize relative gains as a condition 
that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international 
anarchy, Kenneth Oye a liberal scholar argued in his article ‘Explaining 
Cooperation under Anarchy” that cooperation and stability are more likely 
to emerge under international anarchy through Payoffs. He uses his game 
matrix or payoff structure to explain how cooperation and stability can 
emerge under international anarchy. Just like Jervis in his Stag Hunt 
game, Oye agreed with Jervis that one of the best scenarios for 
cooperation and stability to emerge under anarchy is when both sides 
realized the mutual benefits of cooperation (CC). Kenneth Oye explains 
that payoff structure can actually determine the significance of 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (1985:6). 





According to Oye, for cooperation and stability to emerge under 
international anarchy, both actors must realize that cooperation is 
beneficial to both of them in order to engage. Oye argued that the 
likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under anarchy becomes 
more unlikely when both actors cannot realize any mutual benefit of 
cooperation. And for mutual benefits to exist the main actors or states 
involved must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD) 
(Oye, 1985:6). This means that for stability to emerge under international 
anarchy, states must be prepared to cooperate rather than defect. They 
must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD). For 
instance, a state will be less likely to cooperate with another state for 
stability to emerge under international anarchy if it sees that state as a 




On the other hand, the state will be more willing to cooperate with 
another state if it sees that state as an ally that they both share a common 
interest or benefit. In sum, Kenneth Oye in his game matrix approach 
argued that cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under 
international anarchy in situations where both states share mutual benefits 
or interests. This argument by Kenneth Oye is similar to the one made by 
Jervis in his Stag Hunt game where he explained that mutual cooperation 
(CC) is the best situation where cooperation and stability are more likely to 
emerge under international anarchy (Jervis, 1978:178). Similarly, Kenneth 
Oye in his article “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy” also agrees with 
Jervis that if the cost of exploitation is high, states will be less likely to 
cooperate because they feel that they will be exploited by others and this 
will reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. 
Contrarily, cooperation, and stability will be more likely to emerge under 
international anarchy if there is a low risk that states to be exploited by 
others (Oye, 1985, Jervis, 1978:171- 





172). Hence, both Kenneth Oye(a liberal) and Jervis (a realist) believe that 
it is more likely for stability to emerge under international anarchy in 
situations where states have mutual benefits or interests. Moreover, Oye 
and Jervis agree that it is easier for stability to emerge under anarchy when 
large and powerful states who can protect themselves in times of war deal 
with each other because they are aware that their cooperation is for their 
mutual benefit. On the other, if one state is more powerful than another it is 
difficult for stability to emerge under international anarchy because the 
security of the powerful state provides a base from which it can exploit the 




Furthermore, both Oye and Jervis agree that smaller or weaker states 
who feel that they might be exploited by a large powerful state will buy arms 
to protect themselves against the large powerful state. According to 
Kenneth Oye, the acquisition of arms by the smaller state to protect itself 
will anger the large, powerful state and reduces the likelihood of 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Jervis 
seems to agree with Oye on this, he explained that such a situation will 
lead to a “Security Dilemma” (Jervis, 1978:175). However, Oye differs from 
other realists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer here because Oye believes 
that cooperation can easily increase the likelihood of stability to emerge 
under international anarchy. On the contrary, Waltz and Mearsheimer 
argued that cooperation is difficult to achieve and maintain under 












2.4 Number of Actors 
 
Unlike realists such as Kenneth Waltz, who argued for bipolarity as a 
condition that can increase the possibility of peace or stability to emerge 
under international anarchy, Kenneth Oye again offers a different 
perspective from Waltz on how stability can emerge under international 
anarchy. Oye goes further to argue that the likelihood of stability to emerge 
under international anarchy is not only affected by bipolarity as Waltz 
posits, but also by the number of main actors or players involved in a 
negotiation (Oye, 1985). Kenneth Oye explained that the prospect for 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy reduces as 
the number of significant actors or players increases (Oye, 1985: 18). He 
explains that the number of actors can actually affect states' cooperation 




For instance, Oye noted that a large number of significant actors 
involved in a negotiation makes it difficult for states to identify and 
recognize their common interests and it makes it difficult for states to 
anticipate the behavior of other actors which can hinder cooperation among 
them (Ibid). Kenneth Waltz seems to agree with Oye on the need for a 
small number of main actors in the international scene when argued that a 
“small number of great powers” under a bipolar system will increase the 
likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy 
(Waltz, 1979). Moreover, Oye believes the lack of cooperation among 
states at the international level will reduce the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. Overall, Kenneth Oye believes that 
one condition under which cooperation and stability can emerge under 
international anarchy is to reduce the number of main actors involved in a 
negotiation. A lesser number of main actors or players involved in a 
negotiation according to him 





will increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. Contrarily, Oye also believes that the greater the 
number of main actors involved in a negotiation at the international level, 
the lesser the chances of cooperation and stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. On top of that, Kenneth Oye believes that 
cooperation in international politics requires some form of recognition of 
opportunities for the advancement of mutual interest and policy once those 
opportunities have been identified (Oye, 1985: 18). 
Furthermore, Oye explains that one difficulty in having a large number of 
main actors or players involved in a negotiation at the international level is 
that it diminishes the ability to sanction defectors, and strategies of 
reciprocity become even more difficult for states to implement without 
triggering a collapse of cooperation (Ibid). Oye argued that when the ability 
to punish or sanction defectors decreases more actors or states will have a 
free ride to defect from international agreements. He noted that a strategy 
of defection can easily spread among the actors causing more actors to 
defect, which will hinder the likelihood of cooperation and stability to 




2.5 Modifying Payoffs 
 
Again, Kenneth Oye also explains that one condition under which stability 
can emerge under international anarchy is by modifying payoffs. He noted 
that since payoffs or mutual benefits affect the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under international anarchy, states can use several unilateral 
strategies to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge 
under international anarchy (Oye, 1985:10). For instance, he suggested 
that one unilateral strategy that states can use to increase the likelihood of 
cooperation and stability to emerge under 





international anarchy is to acquire defensive weapons rather than offensive 
weapons (Oye, 1985). According to Oye, if a superpower state chooses to 
acquire defensive weapons rather than offensive weapons, it will reduce 
the chances of this superpower state being exploited by other states and it 
will reduce its adversary’s fear of exploitation thereby increasing the 
likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international 
anarchy. Similarly, Oye also states that another unilateral strategy that can 
be used to modify payoffs to increase the likelihood of stability to emerge 
under international anarchy is for states to publicize decisions or unilateral 
agreements that they reached with each other. Kenneth Oye explains that 
publicizing these unilateral decisions or agreements will help to diminish 
the payoffs link with defection from the agreement (Oye, 1985:10). 
According to him, states will be forced to respect and keep the agreement 
if the payoffs link with the defection from the agreement is diminished and 





Also, Oye explains that cooperation or stability is more likely to emerge 
under international anarchy if states promote strategies of reciprocity. He 
explained that strategies of reciprocity can help promote cooperation by 
establishing a direct connection between an actor’s present behavior and 
anticipated future benefits (Oye, 1985: 14). According to Oye an example 
of a strategy of reciprocity that states can use to can increase the likelihood 
of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy is the 
Tit-For-Tat strategy (Ibid). He argued that this strategy increases the 
likelihood of cooperation among states by shaping the future 
consequences of defecting from present cooperation. Under the Tit –For 
Tat strategy states will be punished or sanction if they go against or defect 
from unilateral agreements. Oye believes that strategies of reciprocity such 
as Tit-For Tat will reduce the number of defectors from 





international agreements and thereby increases the likelihood of 
cooperation and stability to emerge in an anarchic international system. 
On the other hand, Oye argued that if sanctions are severe, it becomes 
difficult for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. 
He believes that one way to solve this problem is to restructure the 
situation so that sanctioning for defectors becomes more feasible (Oye, 
1985). Both Oye and Jervis agree that cooperation and stability are more 
likely to emerge under international anarchy if the main players involved 
have mutual benefits of cooperation. However, Kenneth Oye differs with 
Jervis on this issue of mutual benefits as a condition for cooperation and 
stability to emerge under international anarchy because Oye goes further 
to explain how unilateral strategies could be used at the international level 
to modify payoffs or mutual benefits in order to increase the likelihood of 
cooperate and stability to emerge under international anarchy, something 




2.6 Continued Interaction 
 
Furthermore, in contrast to realist perspectives on the condition that can 
increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy, 
Kenneth Oye also argued that continued interaction among states is 
another condition that can increase the likelihood of cooperation and 
stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to Oye, it is 
illogical to think that states will adhere to international agreements under a 
single –play condition in an international system where there is no 
centralized authority (Oye, 1985). Here Oye seems to agree with other 
realists such as Grieco, Waltz, and Mearsheimer that there is no central 
authority in the 





international system. However, he differs from other liberals such as 
Keohane who believes that international institutions can act as a central 
authority under international anarchy. 
Kenneth Oye argued that defection will become a dominant strategy if there 
is a lack of continuing interactions among states in the international system 
because states will be unable to rely on a centralized authority for 
enforcement of an agreement to cooperate. Likewise, Oye noted that states 
will be unable to rely on a centralized authority to dissuade defection. He 
argued that the absence of a centralize authority in the international system 
would make states to be tempted to defect in order to protect themselves 
against the possibilities of defection from others (Oye, 1985:13). According 
to Oye, when a state defects from an international agreement, it dissuades 
other states and makes it more difficult for them to cooperate in the future; 
hence, this hinders the possibility of stability to emerge under international 
anarchy. Therefore, continuing interaction among states, according to him 
is vital in international politics to avoid defection and to increase the 





2.7 International Regimes 
 
Neoliberal scholar Robert Keohane in his article “The Demand for 
International Regimes” argues that one condition under which stability can 
emerge under international anarchy is through membership in international 
regimes or institutions. According to Keohane, membership in international 
regimes can help to increase the possibility of cooperation and stability to 
emerge under international anarchy by providing information about the 
behaviors of others, by monitoring the behavior of members, and by 
reporting members' compliance (1982:346-347). He argued that 
international regimes can help to facilitate cooperation among members at 
the 





international level by providing norms, rules, principles, and procedures 
that can help states to overcome barriers to cooperation (Ibid). According 
to Keohane international regimes makes it easier for actors to realize their 
mutual interests (1982:354), he believes that realizing mutual benefits 
through international regimes or institutions can increase the cooperation 
among actors. Keohane argues that an increase in cooperation among 
actors who have mutual interests will increase the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. Furthermore, Keohane contends that 
regimes can clearly define what constitutes a defection and help prescribe 
punishment for defection which reduces the fear that a state will be 
exploited by other members of the regime; this according to Keohane can 





Keohane’s argument that cooperation through membership in 
international institutions will increase the likelihood of stability to emerge 
under international anarchy is similar to the arguments made by other 
liberal scholars Kenneth Oye. Both Keohane and Oye agree that 
cooperation is needed between states at the international level to increase 
the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. While 
realists predict that conflict should be the norm in international politics, 
liberals such as Keohane believe that there is cooperation in the 
international scene despite anarchy. These liberal scholars often cite 
cooperation in trade, human rights, collective security among other issues 
as evidence that cooperation exists internationally even under anarchy. 
Moreover, the difference between Keohane and Kenneth Oye for example, 
is that Keohane argued that international regimes are vital in promoting 
cooperation among actors. He places more emphasis on the importance of 
international regimes to increase the possibility for states to cooperate and 
for stability to emerge under international anarchy. In 





Contrast, Kenneth Oye does not emphasize the importance of international 
regimes when he discusses cooperation among states as a condition 
under which stability can emerge in international anarchy. For liberals like 
Kenneth Oye, the number of main actors involved in a negotiation is more 
important to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge 
under international anarchy than membership in international regimes like 
Keohane emphasizes. For Kenneth Oye, the lesser number of states 
involved in a negotiation, the easier it is for states to cooperate at the 
international level and the easier it is for stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. On the other hand, Keohane disagrees with Oye on 
this, for Keohane membership in international regimes is more important. 
He believes that it increases the likelihood for states to cooperate at the 
international level and that it increases the likelihood of stability to emerge 
under international anarchy. Keohane believes that international regimes 
or institutions can act as a central authority under international anarchy; 
realists do not seem to agree with Keohane on this. For realists such as 
Waltz and Mearsheimer, there is no central authority in the international 
system that is anarchic, and not even international regimes cannot take the 




2.8 Complex Interdependence 
 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S, Nye in “Power and Interdependence 
Revisited” explain that peace can emerge under international anarchy 
through complex interdependence among states. They encourage the use 
of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to promote cooperation and peace among states that have mutual 
benefits (Keohane & Nye, 1987:73). Keohane and Nye believe that 
international organizations like the IMF can 





influence states to be more focused on the gains of complex 
interdependence while neglecting the idea of power. Keohane and Nye 
noted that peace might be achieved through complex relationships 
because states will neglect the idea of power and focus more on the 




Keohane and Nye argue that such cooperation among states will 
increase the likelihood of peace and stability to emerge under international 
anarchy. They explain that economic gains through trade and foreign 
investment will increase cooperation among states and encourages them 
to keep aside other struggles which will increase the possibility for peace 
or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Keohane and Nye 
explain that increasingly complex interdependence among states, 
especially economically will help increase the chances for peace or 
stability to emerge under international anarchy. Contrarily, they argued that 
decreasing complex interdependence among states will increase the 
chances of war, which will, in turn, destabilize peace among states, disrupt 
world peace and reduce the chances for peace or stability to emerge under 




All in all, Keohane and Nye argued that economic interdependence reduces 
international conflict and enhances opportunities for peace and stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. Their argument on how cooperation 
through complex interdependence can increase the likelihood of stability to 
emerge under anarchy is quite similar to the cooperation that Keohane 
emphasized in his article “The Demand for International Regimes”. However, 
in the “The Demand for International Regimes” as aforementioned Keohane 
placed more emphasis on how states’ 





membership in international regimes can increase the likelihood of 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy while in 
“Power and Interdependence Revisited” Keohane and Nye placed more 
emphasis on the strategic economic interdependence among states as a 
condition that can increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge 
under international anarchy. 
Furthermore, Keohane and Nye’s emphasize peace in their explanations 
of how economic inter-dependence among states at the international level 
can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international 
anarchy. This shows that Keohane and Nye differ from realist scholars 
such as Kenneth Waltz, who argued that peace is only possible in 
international anarchy under certain conditions like bipolarity. However, 
Keohane and Nye agree with other liberal scholars like Kenneth Oye that 
cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international 
anarchy if states have “mutual benefits” from cooperation. On the other 
hand, they disagree on how mutual benefits among states can actually 
increase the likelihood of cooperation and peace to emerge under 
international anarchy. While Keohane and Nye argued that the gains from 
complex interdependence will increase the likelihood of peace or stability to 
emerge under international anarchy. Other liberals like Kenneth Oye 
argued that modifying payoffs or mutual benefits are the conditions that will 
increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under 




2.9 Democratic Peace Thesis 
 
Next, building on Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle in “Liberalism and World 
Politics” argued that the formation of an alliance between democratic states 
in world politics can increase the 





likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. He 
argued that the existence of liberal democratic states such as the U.S.A, 
Japan, and other European countries can increase the likelihood of peace 
or stability to emerge under international anarchy because democracies 
are more peaceful in their foreign relations (Doyle. 1986:1151). According 
to Doyle, democracies are hesitant to go to war with other democracies 
which will increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. In other words, he argues that democracies do not 
attack each other and democracies behave differently towards each other 




Besides, Doyle argued that democratic states are reluctant to go to war 
with each other because they must answer to their citizens. According to 
him, citizens pay the price of war in “blood and treasure; if the price of 
conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to the electorate” 
(Doyle, 1986:1162-1163). Doyle explains that in democratic states, foreign 
policy decisions carrying the risk of war are debated openly and not made 
behind closed doors, which means that both the public and policymakers 
are sensitized to the costs of fighting which makes democracies to be 
hesitant to go to war which increases the possibility of stability to emerge 
under an anarchical international system. John M. Owen under liberal 
scholar agrees with Doyle that democratic states do not go to war with 
each other. He noted that most democratic states in our contemporary 
society have adopted the democratic peace thesis as an important part of 
their foreign policy, for example, the democratic peace theory constitutes 
an important part of U.S foreign policy (Owen, 1994: 87). 





Doyle and supporters of the Democratic Peace Thesis believe that peace 
and stability will be more likely to emerge under international anarchy if 
more states in the world practice democracy or include democratic peace 
thesis in their foreign policies because democratic states are naturally 
peaceful and they are hesitant to go to war with each other which will 
increase the possibility of world peace and stability to emerge under 
international anarchy. Moreover, Doyle believes that peace will increase in 
international politics if more states practice democracy because democratic 
states cooperate more with each other than they do with non-democratic 
states. This position by Doyle contrast with the perspective of realist 
scholars like Mearsheimer, who believe that power and hegemony can 
better increase the chances of peace or stability to emerge under 




In addition, realist like Waltz also disagrees with Doyle that alliances 
between democratic states can increase the likelihood of peace or stability 
to emerge under international anarchy. Rather Waltz argued that not even 
the growth in numbers of democratic states can override the structure of 
international politics to creating an increasingly peaceful international 
system (Waltz, 2000). Overall, Doyle and supporters of the Democratic 
Peace Thesis argued that domestic systems not international systems 
matter. In contrast, Keohane as a neoliberal institutionalist, Oye (a liberal), 
and Jervis (a defensive realist), all agree with structural realists like Waltz 
and Mearsheimer that the international anarchical international system, not 
domestic systems, drives state behavior. 





4 The Constructivist vs. Realists and Liberals Approaches to 
Anarchy and their Perspectives on the Conditions that can increase 




4.1 The Constructivist vs. Realists and Liberals Approaches to Anarchy 
 
Moving on to constructivism, the constructivist approach to anarchy is 
different from both realist and liberal approaches. The constructivist 
approach to anarchy is often summed up by Alexander Wendt’s assertion 
that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt: 1992: 391). That is to say 
that anarchy is not inherent in the international system in the manner in 
which other IR schools of thought such as realism and liberalism envision 
it, but rather it is socially constructed by states in the system. Wendt claims 
that anarchy is what we make of it also suggests that anarchy has multiple 
meanings for different actors or states. In this sense, Wendt suggests that 
our approach to anarchy is dependent upon the meaning that we attach to 
anarchy. Adem clarifies this by stating that things only exist because we 
believe them to and that “if states, as well as non-state actors, interact with 
the ‘belief’ that they are in an anarchic environment, we would be bound to 
witness a particular set of behavior” (Adem: 2002: 20). This appears to 
suggest that a state or non-state actor’s understanding of anarchy will lead 
them to behave in particular ways in the social context of international 
politics. While constructivists agree with realists and liberals that anarchy 
exists, constructivists disputes that anarchy is the fundamental condition of 
the international system. While realists view the international system as 
static and war as unavoidable, constructivists would dispute this, arguing 
that interests and identities change throughout history, allowing 
cooperation between states that had previously had conflicts 





(Fierke: 2007). An example of this would be the states within the EU who 
were former enemies but have now learned to cooperate. In terms of how 
states will behave under international anarchy, constructivists take more 
of a middle position between realist and liberal schools of thought 
because constructivists believe that international anarchy is neither bad 
nor good (International Relations.Org, 2016), Hence, constructivists 
disagree with realists ideas that international anarchy drive states to act in 
certain ways (Wendt,1992). For constructivists, anarchy does not lead to a 
particular type of state behavior, rather, constructivist argued that anarchy 
in international politics has no set of behavioral responses; states can 
make what they want from anarchy (Wendt, 1992). Wendt explains that it 
is not the notion of anarchy that can cause actors to behave in a particular 
way in the international system, but rather, actors in the international 
system can make of anarchy what they will. In sum, though constructivists 
agree with realists and liberals that anarchy does exist in the international 
system; they argue that the effects of anarchy are dependent upon the 
inter-subjective meanings we attach to it. 
Constructivists, such as Hopf, argue that anarchy can be perceived as an 




While realists view the international system as static and war as 
unavoidable, Wendt argued that interest and identities change throughout 
history, allowing states that had previously had conflicts to cooperate 
under international anarchy. Wendt contends that more direct forms of 
cooperation among states at the international level can actually increase 
the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy (Wendt, 
1992: 416). He explains that a necessary condition for such direct forms of 
cooperation to occur among states for stability to emerge under 
international anarchy is that outcomes be positively interdependent in the 
sense that 





potential gains exist which cannot be realized by unilateral actions (Ibid). 
Here Wendt seems to agree with Grieco (a realist) and other liberal scholars 
like Kenneth Oye that stability can emerge under international anarchy 
through cooperation among states at the international level. 
Moreover, Wendt noted that states such as Brazil and Botswana may 
recognize each other’s sovereignty, but they need further incentives to 
cooperate at the international level (Ibid). 
According to Wendt, one important incentive that states could use is “the 
growing, dynamic density of interactions among states.” This suggests that 
interaction among states at the international level can increase the 
likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international 
anarchy. Wendt’s argument here that interactions among states can 
increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under 
international anarchy is similar to the argument made by Liberal scholars 
such as Kenneth Oye. Oye in “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy” 
argued that continuing interaction among states at the international level 
would increase the possibilities for states to cooperate which will increase 





Also, Wendt argued that joint gains will increase the likelihood of 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy while 
interdependence also entails vulnerability and the risk of being exploited, 
which can reduce the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge 
under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992: 416). Wendt argument that 
interdependence can lead to exploitation which can reduce the likelihood of 
stability to emerge under anarchy differs from the position of other liberals 
like Keohane and Nye who contend that economic interdependence 
among states can actually increase the prospects of peace or stability to 
emerge under international anarchy (Keohane & Nye, 1987). 





Next, Wendt ‘s argument that joint gains can increase the likelihood of 
stability to emerge under international anarchy is similar to the argument 
made by liberals like Kenneth Oye, both Wendt and Oye agree that mutual 
benefits of players can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability 
to emerge under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992: Oye, 1985). 
However, the difference between Wendt and Oye here is that Wendt 
emphasizes the importance of identity and interest when discussing 
cooperation under anarchy; He argued that interest and identities change 
throughout history, allowing states that had previously had conflicts to 
cooperate under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992). This is something 
that Oye does not emphasize in his perspectives on the conditions that can 




Furthermore, Wendt argued that a constructivist’s analysis of 
cooperation would concentrate on how the expectations produced by 
behavior affect identities and interests which is different from the realist’s 
and liberal’s analysis of cooperation. He argued that the process by which 
egoistic states learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of 
reconstructing their interests in terms of a shared commitment to social 
norms (Wendt, 1992: 417). Hence, constructivists agree with liberals that 
cooperation among states at the international scene can actually increase 
the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. In 
contrast, realists maintain that cooperation is difficult to achieve and 
sustain under international anarchy and they emphasize that peace is 
possible under certain conditions such as bipolarity (Waltz, 1979, 
Mearsheimer, 2001). 





Besides, Wendt also argued that stability can emerge under international 
anarchy through the creation of institutions as it internalizes identities and 
interests, thus, creating a new understanding of self and other (Wendt 
1992, 411). This suggests that institutions can help reconstruct identities. 
As an example, He argued that before the creation of institutions like the 
European Union (EU) Germany was viewed as an aggressive state, but as 
a member of the EU, Germany is no longer viewed in this manner. Wendt’s 
argument that institutions can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge 
under international anarchy is in line with the liberals' belief that the right 
institutions can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to 






In Summation, this paper has compared and contrasted the realist, liberal, 
and constructivist approach to anarchy and perspectives put forth by 
scholars from these three schools of thought on the conditions that can 
increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. 
As Grieco noted, realism presents a fundamentally pessimistic analysis of 
the prospects of international cooperation among states. While liberal 
scholars such as Keohane and Nye placed more emphasis on the 
importance of international institutions to explain the economic 
interdependence of states as a condition under which stability can emerge 
under international anarchy, Kenneth Oye another liberal discusses 
cooperation among states without emphasizing the importance of 
international institutions. Instead, Oye placed more emphasis on the need 
to reduce the number of actors and different strategies that can be used by 
states to modify mutual benefits in order to increase the likelihood of 
cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. This 
shows that even within the same school of thought, scholars offer 





contrasting perspectives on the conditions that can increase the likelihood 
of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Moreover, this paper 
showed that realists, liberals, and constructivists agree that the 
international system is anarchic. However, realists such as Jervis, Grieco, 
Waltz, and Mearsheimer believe that there is no higher political authority 
that has power over sovereign states and that anarchy makes it difficult for 
states to be willing to cooperate in international politics. On the other hand, 
the paper showed that liberals such as Keohane and Oye agree with 
realists that anarchy exists in the international system, but also disagree 
with realist that there is no higher political authority above sovereign states. 
Rather, liberals like Keohane and Nye argued that international institutions 
play a vital role in the cooperation among states in the international arena. 
They believe that international institutions can help states to cooperate or 
work together, even under international anarchy. On the other side of the 
debate, constructivists agree with realists and liberals that international 
anarchy exists, however, constructivists contend that anarchy is what states 
make of it. 
 
 
Next, the paper showed that Doyle and supporters of the Democratic 
Peace Thesis argued that domestic systems not international systems 
matter. In contrast, Keohane as a neoliberal institutionalist, Oye (a liberal), 
and Jervis (a defensive realist), all agree with structural realists like Waltz 
and Mearsheimer that the international anarchical international system, not 
domestic systems, drives state behavior. Similarly, this paper also showed 
that realists believe that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain 
under international anarchy because of relative gains. Realists like Waltz 
and Grieco emphasize relative gains when discussing cooperation and 
stability under international anarchy while liberals emphasize absolute 
gains of cooperation. 
Realist contends that cooperation is difficult to achieve under anarchy and 
that certain conditions 





like bipolarity, game theory, and hegemony can increase the likelihood of 
peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Contrarily, 
liberals disagree with realists on these conditions, rather, liberals argue 
that cooperation is possible among states even under international 
anarchy and they contend that certain conditions such as international 
institutions, economic interdependences, and democratic peace treaties, 
absolute gains, game matrix, and modifying payoffs will provide states the 
opportunity to reduce conflict and increase the likelihood of cooperation 
and peace to emerge under international anarchy. On the other side of the 
coin, constructivists agree with liberals that certain conditions like 
international institutions can increase the possibility of cooperation and 
stability to emerge under international anarchy. 
 
 
However, constructivists emphasize the importance of identity and 
interest when discussing cooperation under anarchy, something that 
realists and liberals do not emphasize in their perspectives on international 
anarchy. Wendt explained that interest and identities change throughout 
history, allowing states that had previously had conflicts to cooperate 
under international anarchy. As the essay suggests, it is possible to argue 
that realist liberal and constructivist scholars have contrasting approaches 
and perspectives to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the 
likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. 
However, whatever their approaches and perspectives to anarchy, all 
three schools of thought provide solid contributions on the concept of 
anarchy and the conditions that can increase the possibility of stability to 
emerge in an anarchic international system. Therefore, realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism will likely remain vital theories of IR. 
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